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ESSAY
The Evolution of Chutzpah as a Legal
Term: The Chutzpah Championship,
Chutzpah Award, Chutzpah Doctrine,
and Now, the Supreme Court
BY JACK ACHIEZER GUGGENHEIM*
I. INTRODUCTION
le many have taken note of the Supreme Court's recent
deision in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley I for
V • its effect on the interaction between government funding
and free speech, another significant implication of the case may have been
missed This potentially overlooked factor is an instance of first impres-
sion in the Supreme Court: it is the first time a decision of the Supreme
Court, albeit a concurrence, used the term "chutzpah."
*Associate, Sidley &Austin, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1993, YeshivaUniversity;
J.D. 1996, Columbia University; COA 1996, Parker School of International and
Comparative Law. This Essay expresses only the views of the author. Other works
of the author which address the interaction of American jurisprudence and Jewish
culture include KOA is A.O.K: The Second Circuit's Recent Kosher Trademark
Decision Further Illustrates That the Patent and Trademark Office Must Answer
to a Higher Authority, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 203 (1998), and Art &
Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation, 8 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 699 (1998).
'National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
2 For example, Professor Volokh, who along with Judge Alex Kozinski wrote
on the interaction of Yiddish and the law in Lawsuit, Shmawsuit, 103 YALE L.J.
463 (1993), chose not to mention the use of the word "chutzpah" in Finley in a
newspaper piece he wrote about the decision. See Eugene Volokh, How Free is
Speech When the Government Pays?, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A18.
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"Chutzpah" is a Yiddish word connoting brazenness.3 In World Granite
& Marble Corp. v. Wil-Freds Construction, Inc.,4 the court noted the
plaintiff's chutzpah and cited Webster's New World College Dictionary5
as defining "chutzpah" to mean "'shameless audacity; impudence; brass."6
In Lugo v. Alvarado,7 the court commented upon the appellant's chutzpah
and cited Leo Rosten's The Joys of Yiddish,s which defines "chutzpah" as
a Yiddish idiom meaning "'gall, brazen nerve, effrontery." 9 Neither
English translation fully does the word justice, as neither definition fully
captures the audacity simultaneously bordering on insult and humor which
the word "chutzpah" connotes. Indeed, in Engel Industries, Inc. v. First
American Bank, NA.,° Judge Sporkin notedthe defendant's chutzpah. Also
citing Leo Rosten's The Joys of Yiddish, he defined "chutzpah" as
"presumption-plus-arrogance such as no other word, and no other language
can do justice to."'I However, in defining "chutzpah" in the context of
American jurisprudence, it is also important to note that "[1]egal chutzpah
is not always undesirable, and without it our system ofjurisprudence would
suffer.' ' 2
Part of the uniqueness of Yiddish words like "chutzpah" is that their
meaning varies depending on context and degree. In the right circum-
stances and to the right degree, "chutzpah" may intimate spunk. In the
wrong situation orto an improper degree, "chutzpah" implies insolence. As
Professor Dershowitz has stated:
[T]he word chutzpah has both a positive and a negative connotation. To
the perpetrator of chutzpah it means boldness, assertiveness, awillingness
to demand what is due, to defy tradition, to challenge authority, to raise
eyebrows. To the victim of chutzpah, it means unmitigated gall, nerve,
3 See Lugo v. Alvarado, 819 F.2d 5, 6-7 (lst Cir. 1987).
4 World Granite & Marble Corp. v. Wil-Freds Constr., Inc., No. 96 C 6441,
1996 WL 763230 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 1996).
5 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 405 (3d ed. 1996).
6 World Granite, 1996 WL 763230, at *1.
7 Lugo v. Alvarado, 819 F.2d 5 (lst Cir. 1987).
8 LEO ROSTEN, THE JOYS OF YIDDISH (1968).
9 Lugo, 819 F.2d at 6, 7 (quoting ROSTEN, supra note 8, at 93).
10 Engel Indus., Inc. v. First Am. Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1992).
" Id. at 15 n.7. Judge Sporkin also employed the word "chutzpah" in his de-
cision in Teich v. Food and Drug Administration, 751 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D.D.C.
1990).
" Chaffee v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1164,1167-68 (D.N.J. 1995).
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uppityness, arrogance, hypercritical demanding. It is truly in the eye of
the beholder.13
For example, the plaintiff in Torres v. CBSNews'4 was an attorney who
offered to fill out visa lottery applications for a fee. He charged that
Congressman Charles Schumer's statement, "In Brooklyn, we have a word
for something like that-chutzpah," was false and defamatory."5 The
plaintiff obviously felt that "chutzpah" under the circumstances was not a
positive description. He therefore sued for injury to professional character
and reputation, mental anguish, and loss of business. He claimed actual
damages of $100 million and also sought punitive damages. 6 The court,
however, granted Congressman Schumer's motion to dismiss the com-
plaints against him. 7 Similarly, in In re Celotex Corp.,8 the attorney for
judgment creditors moved to have a judge recused due to bias against the
attorney. He pointed to the judge's use of the word "chutzpah" as a clear
manifestation of the judge's partiality. 9 However, the court, noting other
judges' use of the word, denied the attorney's motion after finding that
"chutzpah" is not a derogatory term indicating bias.2'
In recent years, Yiddish words have increasingly made appearances in
court decisions. This occurrence reflects not only the integration of Jewish
lawyers into the fuller spectrum of American judicial culture but also the
discovery that Yiddish words offer a unique and spirited means of
encapsulating and presenting ideas, characteristics, descriptions, and
emotions. As the court in Smith v. Farley2 noted, Yiddishisms such as
"chutzpah" "have become absorbed into standard English and are now
applied to members of all racial and ethnic groups."' 2
Of all words in the Yiddish language, "chutzpah" has enjoyed
particularly strong and widespread popularity. It seems natural that federal
13 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, CHUTZPAH 18 (1991).
'4 Torres v. CBS News, 879 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 71 F.3d 406 (2d
Cir. 1995).
'1 d. at 313.
16 See id.
17 See id.
" In re Celotex Corp., 137 B.R. 868 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
'
9 See id. at 876.
2 See id. at 876 n.1 1 (citing Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l,
808 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Archer v. Levy, 543 So.2d 863, 864 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989); Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 553 A.2d 251,
257 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)).
21 Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1995).
22Id. at 664.
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courts in New York, which is probably home to the greatest concentration
of Yiddish speakers in the United States, have used the word "chutzpah"
in numerous decisions.' It also seems natural that the Federal District
Court for the District of Las Vegas, a city with exuberant charm, would
have used "chutzpah" in a decision.24 However, the repeated use of the
word "chutzpah" by the Federal District Court for the Virgin Islands seems
more surprising.' Perhaps even more unexpected is the use of the word
"chutzpah" in decisions by district courts in Iowa, Alabama, and Puerto
Rico.26
The first "lawyer"to have exhibited chutzpah may have been Abraham;
in Genesis, Abraham has the nerve to defend the people of Sodom against
the divine wrath.27 However, "chutzpah" did not make its debut in
American federal jurisprudence until 1973, in a decision by the United
States Court of Claims (now known as the United States Court of Federal
Claims). 8 The courts in our nation's capital have continued to raise the
profile of this boisterous word by creating a "chutzpah championship,"
"chutzpah award," and "chutzpah doctrine."'29 The United States Court of
Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the Court
See, e.g., United States v. Blau, 961 F. Supp. 626, 633 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
affid, 159 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1998); Torres v. CBS News, 879 F. Supp. 309, 313
(S.D.N.Y.), afftd, 71 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 1995); Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,
845 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 142
F.PD. 597, 599 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Pan Am. Corp., 140 B.R. 336, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Russo, 1991 WL 177347, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
4, 1991); Katarav. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 907,911 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 835 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1987); Gemveto
Jewelry Co., Inc. v. Jeff Cooper Inc., 568 F. Supp. 319, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
24See Johnson v. Incline Village Gen. Improvement Dist., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1117 (D. Nev. 1998)
' See Wells v. Rockefeller, 97 F.R.D. 42,46 (D.V.I. 1983), afl'd inpart and
vacated in part, 728 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1984); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v.
Construcciones Weri, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 164, 183 (D.V.I. 1975).
2 See Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 996 F. Supp. 1130, 1145 (M.D.
Ala. 1998); Benson v. Richardson, Civ. No. C-86-2009, 1990 WL 290144, at *33
(N.D. Iowa July 16, 1990), amended by 1990 WL 290145 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 2,
1990), affid, 950 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1991); Torres v. Hernandez Colon, 672 F.
Supp. 639,655 n.1 (D.P.R. 1987), aff'dinpartandrev'dinpart, 889 F.2d314 (1st
Cir. 1989).
27 See Genesis 18:26-33. See generally Alan M. Dershowitz, The Vanishing
Jewish Lawyer, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 34.
'8 See Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1973).29See infra Parts V-VII.
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, all of which are frequently
the arbiters of extremely complicated technical nuances such as military
and administrative agency regulations whose interpretation hang on the
placement of a comma or a knowledge of quantum physics, have been the
most ardent boosters of the entry of "chutzpah" into the judicial
vernacular.30 With all-the attention such prominent courts were giving the
word, it was only a matter of time until the buzz reached the highest court
in the land and "'chutzpah" made its debut in a concurring decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States.31
II. YIDDISH
"Chutzpah" is one of the most widely known and oft-used words of
Yiddish, a language which offers unique expression, emphasis, andnuance.
Yiddish is a language that has been used among European Jews and their
descendants for the past 1000 years.32 Yiddish is an intricate fusion of
several unpredictably modified languages.33
Over the centuries, Yiddish, in its vast territorial scattering, became
regionally differentiated.34 In the main, the Yiddish sound system has been
30 The Boards of Contract Appeals, which also must address difficult statutory
and specification interpretation, have also used "chutzpah" in their decisions. See,
e.g., Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Indeed, even the most
sophisticated arbiter of linguistic nuance, the United States Tax Court, has found
that only the word "chutzpah" will suffice in certain circumstances.
In Farnham v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCII) 1619 (1991), the court found
that petitioner's argument that the IRS sent notice to the wrong address based on
incorrect information which petitioner provided to the IRS, ran afoul of the D.C.
Circuit's chutzpah doctrine. See id. at 1621. The Tax Court also noted the D.C.
Circuit's chutzpah doctrine in Berg v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2004,
2008-09 (1993), noting that ataxpayer's efforts to evade the IRS by failing to leave
a forwarding address and living under an assumed name were subject to the
"chutzpah doctrine."
31 The word "chutzpah" has also made an increasing appearance in legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles, 86 GEo. L.J. 1011, 1029-31 (1998) (suggesting a chutzpah/forfeiture
exception to the Confrontation Clause); Barry Latzer, State Constitutional
Chutzpah, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1733 (1996) (stating that state supreme court's
decisions differing with United States Supreme Court's decisions of
constitutionality exhibit chutzpah).
32 See 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 789 (1972).
33 See id. (noting use of German and pronunciations and lexicon, along with
influences from multiple Slavic languages).
" See id.
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determined by those German dialects which contributed the bulk of its
basic lexical stock.15 Regional varieties of Yiddish display rich vocalic
distinctions. 6 The basic grammatical plan of Yiddish likewise follows the
German model, as modified by a number of innovations. 7 The graphic
basis of Yiddish writing is the Hebrew alphabet with a number of
standardized diacritics." The complex fusion of several different languages
and the rise ofpurely internal innovations have given the Yiddish language
words of dramatic nuance not present in the contributing languages. 9
The use of the Yiddish language reflected the historical reality that
from the tenth through the eighteenth centuries, the Jews of Europe
generally did not enjoy the rights of citizenship of the countries in which
they lived.40 Yiddish therefore developed during this period as an expres-
sion of autonomy.41 A rich cultural literature was written in Yiddish and
manifested in both serious and humorous writings, newspapers, and
theater.42 The migration ofpeoples inthe nineteenth and twentieth centuries
brought Yiddish to many different parts of the world.43 It has been
estimated that on the eve of World War II, there were eleven million
Yiddish speakers.' This number was drastically reduced by the Holocaust
and a shift to the native tongue of countries that offered equal rights.45
While the use of the language as a primary vernacular has been ever-
declining, recent years have seen a sentimental and intellectual renewed
interest in Yiddish. 6
M. JEWISH AMERICAN LAWYERS
Yiddish entered the lexicon of American jurisprudence through two
main avenues. First, non-Jewish and Jewish members of the bar alike
realized that Yiddish can provide the best word with the proper connotation
for a particular situation. Second, society recognized American Jewish
'
35 See id. at 790.
36 See id.
31 See id. (discussing vowels, diphthongs, and pronunciations).
31 See id. at 791.
39 See id. at 792.
40 See id. at 789.
41 See id.
42 See id.
41 See id.
"4See id.
45 See id.
' See id.
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lawyers as part of the wonderful American cultural mosaic.47 Indeed, it is
somewhat ironic that Yiddish has really only begun to enter the American
legal lexicon now, at a time when so many Jewish lawyers are
assimilating.4 8 Motivated by the Biblical adage, "Justice, justice shall thou
pursue,' 9 and fortified with a history of Talmudic scholarship, Jews have
made substantial contributions to the development of law.50
The first Jew to professionally study law in the United States was
Moses Levy, who was admitted to the Philadelphia bar in 1778.51 He
became a successful and distinguished attorney and later served as judge
of the District Court for the City of Philadelphia.'2 Jews began to make
their mark and rise to prominence in the legal profession by the beginning
of the nineteenth century.53 Two Jewish lawyers of particular prominence
in the nineteenth century were Philip Phillips and Judah Philip Benjamin.
Phillips argued more than 400 appeals before the Supreme Court of the
United States.54 Benjamin was the first Jew to be offered a seat on the
Supreme Court; he turned down the offer, however, and subsequently
became the attorney general of the Confederacy.55 The twentieth century
47 See generally Jerome Homblass, The Jewish Lawyer, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1639 (1993); Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer Question, 27 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1259 (1996). Both articles discuss the role and identity of the American
Jewish lawyer.48 See generally Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections
on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577 (1993)
(noting the increased difficulty of defining who is an American Jewish lawyer).49Deuteronomy 16:20.
50 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 1503-05 (outlining the
historical progress of Jews in America); see also Robert M. Cover, Obligations: A
Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1987); Samuel
J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality,
Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1199 (1996); Suzanne Last
Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1993).
51 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 1503.
52 See id. However, the first Jewish judge in the United States was a layman,
Isaac Miranda, who was appointed deputy judge of the Vice-Admiralty of the
Province of Pennsylvania in 1727. DavidEmanuel and James Lucena, also laymen,
became justices of the peace in Georgia in 1766 and 1773, respectively. See id.
I See id.
54 See id.
51 See id. After the defeat of the Confederacy, Benjamin escaped to England
where he became a leading counsel of the English bar. Other prominent Jewish
American lawyers of this time included Raphael J. Moses, who was the leading
1998-991
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saw a substantial increase in the number of Jews appointed to judgeships
and university professorships. 6 However, prior to World War II, Jews
continued to face prejudice and were denied entry into various areas of the
law, such as the larger and more established law firms." Nonetheless,
Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter were appointed
to the Supreme Court during this period and are recognized as among the
greatest Justices to sit on the bench. Prominent legal scholars and
philosophers of this time included Max Radin, professor of law at the
University of California, and Morris Raphael Cohen, professor of
philosophy at the City College of New York.59 Outstanding advocates of
this time included Louis Marshall, Louis Nizer, Samuel Leibowitz, and Lee
M. Friedman.'
A gradual improvement in the acceptance and status of Jewish lawyers
took place after World War II.11 To a large extent, Jews found it easier to
be admitted to large law firms. However, research in the 1960s indicated
that discrimination still existed, that Jewish graduates found it harder to
find jobs than non-Jewish graduates, and that Jewish graduates on average
earned lower salaries than non-Jewish graduates.62 As the situation
commercial lawyer of Georgia, and William Mallory Levi, who was ajustice of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana. See id.56 See id. at 1504.
7 See generally Note, The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs-
Discriminatory Effects in Law Firm Hiring Practices, 73 YALE L.J. 625 (1964).
51 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 1503; see also ROBERT
A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988)
(comparing Justices Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis and the influence of their
Jewish heritage on their judicial philosophies); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections
on Way Paving Jewish Justices and Jewish Women, 14 TOURO L. REv. 283 (1998);
Mark Miller, Jurists With a Difference, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1998, at A16
(discussing Justice Cardozo).
Other Jewish judges of note during this period include Judge Julian Mack of the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Horace Stem of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Henry Butzel of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan,
Judge Irving Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals, and Justice Samuel
Kalisch of the New York Supreme Court. See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra
note 32, at 1504.
'9 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 1504.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id. As a result, Jewish lawyers tended to work at Jewish law firms. In
1950, for example, it was estimated that nearly 85% of Jewish lawyers entering law
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continued to improve, Bernard Segal became the first Jew to serve as
president of the American Bar Association, and Simon Sobeloff became
the first Jew to serve as the Attorney General of the United States.63
However, the best representation of the ever-increasing presence and
acceptance of Jewish legal scholars, Jewish members of the bench, and
prominent Jewish advocates and counselors since World War II is the
appointment of four more Jewish luminaries to the Supreme Court: Arthur
Goldberg, Abe Fortas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer.64
One of the most significant aspects of Jewish participation in American
law in the twentieth century has been the extensive interest of American
Jewish lawyers in upholding and extending civil liberties and the substan-
tial influence exerted in such effort on constitutional doctrines affecting
race relations, the administration of criminal justice, and the operation of
the political process. 65 The increased participation of Jews in the legal
profession in some instances brought with it both Jewish scholarship and
Jewish cultural heritage, which occasionally included knowledge of the
Yiddish language.m
IV. YIDDISH AND AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
The unique shades and subtleties that Yiddish allows have made it a
language of choice in recent American jurisprudence when English fails to
provide a word with the proper connotation. According to Judge Alex
firms went to firms where the majority of the partners were Jewish. See id.; see also
Note, supra note 57, at 625.63 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 1505.
6 See Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 285; see also Malvina Halberstam, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg: The First Jewish Woman on the United States Supreme Court, 19
CARDOzO L. REV. 1441 (1998).
65 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 1505. American Jewish
lawyers whose careers have in large measure been dedicated to civil liberties
include Arthur Garfield Hays, Samuel Leibowitz, Walter Pollack, Jack Greenberg,
Anthony Amsterdam, Leonard Boudin, William Kunstler, Osmond Fraenkel,
Norman Dorsen, AryehNeier, Max Radin, Mayer Sulzberger, Horace Stem, David
Bazelon, and Charles Wyzanski. See id.
" See, e.g., Cover, supra note 50; Aaron M. Schreiber, The Jurisprudence of
Dealing with Unsatisfactory Fundamental Law: A Comparative Glance at the
Different Approaches in Medieval CriminalLaw, Jewish Lawandthe UnitedStates
Supreme Court, 11 PACE L. REV. 535 (1991); Stone, supra note 50; Gordon
Tucker, The Confidentiality Rule: A Philosophical Perspective with Reference to
Jewish Law and Ethics, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 99 (1985).
1998-991
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Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Yiddish is quickly supplanting Latin as the spice in American legal argot.67
The earliest reported case that uses a Yiddish word is believed to be In re
Kladneve's Estate, 6 where the judge attempted to use a Yiddish descrip-
tive, but apparently ended up making up a word.69 Similarly, Judge
Kozinski has noted more recently that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit incorrectly defined "bagel."70 The word "kibbitz"
has appeared in at least ten decisions,7' the word "maven" in at least four
decisions, 2 "klutz" in at least three decisions,' and the word "schmooze"
in at least one decision.74 In a subtler use of Yiddish, a California Court of
67 See Kozinski & Volokh, supra note 2, at 463. Kozinski and Volokh's article
has further perpetuated the use of Yiddish in court decisions. Judges, including
Judge Kozinski himself, will use the word "chutzpah" and then cite the article for
support. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060,1068 (6th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Alpex Computer Corp.,
71 F.3d 353, 358 (10th Cir. 1995); Prolerized Schiabo Neu Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 990 F. Supp. 356, 367 (D.N.J. 1997); Chaffee v. Kraft
Gen. Foods, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (D.N.J. 1995); see also Ralph Slovenko,
Plain Yiddish forLawyers and Judges, TRIAL, June 1992, at 86; Gerald F. Uelman,
Plain Yiddish for Lawyers, A.B.A. J., June 1985, at 78. See generally ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, CHUTZPAH (1991).
61 In re Kladneve's Estate, 234 N.Y.S. 246, 247 (Sur. Ct. 1929).
69 See Kozinski & Volokh, supra note 2, at 463 n.4. The word was "schmorer,"
which has no Yiddish meaning. See id.
70See NLRB v. Bagel Baker's Counsel, 434 F.2d 884, 886 (2d Cir. 1970).
7" See Gacy v. Welbom, 994 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Finkel, 151
B.R. 779, 782 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp.
147, 150 (W.D. Pa. 1976); People v. Oliver, 241 Cal. Rptr. 804, 810 (Ct. App.
1987); People v. Holtzman, 294 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); State v.
Davis, 515 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Zannone v. Polino, 155
N.Y.S.2d 836, 837 (City Ct. 1956); Robison v. Robison, 394 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah
1964); In re Bodus' Will, 36 N.W.2d 926,927 (Wis. 1949); Galbraithv. State, 503
P.2d 1192, 1197 (Wyo. 1972).
72 See Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States, 762 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1985);
In re Love, 61 B.R. 558, 558 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); Nova Ribbons Prods., Inc.
v. Marchand, Civil Action No. 89-4340, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13123, at *27
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Farmer v. Supermarkets Gen.
Corp., No. 8607-1244, 1991 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 26, at *4 (Phila. Cty. C.P.
Apr. 11, 1991).
' See Thomas v. City of Evanston, 610 F. Supp. 422, 429 (N.D. El. 1985);
State v. American Equitel Corp., 395 N.E.2d 1355, 1368 (Ohio C.P. 1979);
Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
74 See MCG Dev. Corp. v. Bick Realty Co., 230 S.E.2d 26,27 & n. 1 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1976) (noting variant of spelling and use).
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Appeals decision, apparently referring to the dissent, wrote a footnote in
which the first letter of each sentence spelled out "SCHMUCK. ' 5
Gerald F. Uelman, Dean ofthe Santa Clara School of Law, has likewise
noted the humor and subtle nuances Yiddish can add to legal discourse.76
Because Yiddish can characterize and add nuance in a manner that other
languages cannot, it was only a matter of time before Yiddish words like
"chutzpah" began to enjoy substantial judicial attention.
V. THE CHUTZPAH CHAMPIONSHIP
The first reported use of the word "chutzpah" was Williams v. State,77
an opinion of the Georgia Court of Appeals addressing an individual who
broke into a sheriff s office to steal guns. 78 The decision in Williams was
written by Judge Clark, who went on to write opinions using the Yiddish
words "schmooze, ' 7 9 'tsoriss," 8 0 "shammes," 8' and "gut gezacht. ' 2
However, the federal, national debut of the word "chutzpah" in a reported
decision occurred the following year in Weir v. United States,83 pennedby
Judge Kunzig of the United States Court of Claims. The jurisdiction of the
75See People v. Amo, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 628 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
16See Gerald F. Uelman, Id., 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 335. Dean Uelman named
his law review piece "Id." in the hopes of gaining entry to the Guinness Book of
World Records for the most cited article.
According to Dean Uelman, Justice William 0. Douglas reported that the most
important thing he learned at Columbia Law School was the difference between a
schnook and a schlemiel: the schnook is the one who always spills his soup while
the schlemiel is the one who always gets spilled on. See id. at 342 (citing The
Problems ofLong Criminal Trials, A PanelDiscussion, 34 F.R.D. 155, 184 (1963)
(statement of Edward Bennett Williams)).
Williams v. State, 190 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
78See id. at 785 & n.1.
See MCG Dev. Corp. v. Bick Realty Co., 230 S.E.2d 26, 27 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977) (defining "schmooz" [sic] as "'chat"').
'0 See Banks v. State, 209 S.E.2d 252,253 & n. 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (defining
"tsoriss" as "trouble," "often accompanied by the Yiddish lamentation, 'oy
vay"'); see also Slovenko, supra note 67, at 87.81 See State v. Koon, 211 S.E.2d 924,925 & n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (defining
"shammes" as "policemen," stemming from use by Damon Runyon); see also
Slovenko, supra note 67, at 87 (defining "shanmes" as the beadle or sexton of a
synagogue).
$2See Whitnerv. Georgia State Univ., 228 S.E.2d 200,200 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)
(defining "gut gezacht" as "well spoken").83Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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United States Court of Claims, now known as the United States Court of
Federal Claims, encompasses suits against the United States which
frequently require the precise interpretation of federal statutes and
regulations. It might therefore appear ironic that the Court of Claims was
the first federal court to use the word "chutzpah." Upon further reflection,
though, it actually is quite logical; a court practiced in scrutinized reading
and interpretation is the court one would expect to have the greatest
appreciation for a language and words that offer unique nuances not
otherwise available.
The value of the nuance, emphasis, and emotion embodied in the word
"chutzpah" is evident in its usage in Weir. In Weir, the court considered the
case of a former soldier who made sworn statement that he was a homosex-
ual in order to obtain a premature release from military services. 4
However, after he found that his military discharge influenced his civilian
job opportunities, Weir revealed that he was not a homosexual."5 He argued
that the military should have discovered that he was lying and denied his
discharge.86 Weir then had the temerity to sue for back pay, restoration of
rank, and the value of missed promotions! In its rejection of his claims, the
court described Weir as "the outstanding example of chutzpah to the nth
degree. 87 The value of the word "chutzpah" to the federal judiciary was
thereby confirmed. Indeed, since only the word "chutzpah" could have
done justice to Weir's unbelievable gall, the court did not even bother to
define "chutzpah."
In the same year that Weir was decided, the Court of Claims also
decided Switkes v. United States.18 Dissenting from Judge Kunzig's
majority opinion, Judge Nicholas describedhis colleague's use of the word
"chutzpah" in Weir as the awarding of the "chutzpah championship." 9 In
Switkes a former army medical officer, who, afterbeing admittedly AWOL,
had obtained federal court orders restraining the army from sending him to
Vietnam, brought suit to recover pay and allowances. Judge Kunzig's
majority opinion found that Switkes was not entitled to pay or allowances
for the period he was AWOL. In his dissent, Judge Nicholas found that
Switkes was not truly AWOL, but rather had waffled in his assertion that
he was a conscientious objector and that such waffling was due to the
84 See id. at 618-20.
8 See id. at 621.
86 See id.
87 Id. at 620.
88 Switkes v. United States, 480 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
89Id. at 851 (Nicholas, J., dissenting).
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changes in the legal climate for conscientious objection.9" Therefore, Judge
Nicholas noted that the "chutzpah championship" awarded in Weir was not
in danger of passing to a new holder. 91
Two years later, the United States Court of Claims addressed the true
epitome of chutzpah in Steuer v. United States.92 In Steuer, the plaintiff
argued that the army's failure for eleven years to follow a military
regulation requiring verification of medical certification excused his
fraudulent representations that he had graduated from medical school and
previously worked at a hospital. While the plaintiffs fraud could have
meant that improper medical care was being administered and that lives
were at risk, the case was not a criminal prosecution, but rather a suit by the
nondoctor plaintiffto recover backpay! Judge Bennett wrote in the opinion
that "the court in Weir described plaintiffs claim as 'the outstanding
example of chutzpah to the nth degree.' The instant case is a worthy
rival. 9 3
VI. THE CHUTZPAH AWARD
Judge Bennet brought the word "chutzpah" with him from the Court of
Claims when he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. The transported word would eventually become the
catalyst for the court's chutzpah award.94 In Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart,95
Judge Bennett's dissent. noted the chutzpah displayed in the brazen
assertions of one of the co-defendants. This defendant waited until seven
months after trial and a full four and a half years after becoming aware of
the disputed patent issue to finally raise it in a motion to reconsider. In
spite of this, the defendant argued that it was the plaintiff who was
precluded from arguing issues on appeal which it had not raised in its
original brief. Despite this seven-month delay in making its argument,
defendant argued that it was the plaintiff who was preventing the "just,
90 See id. (Nicholas, J., dissenting).
91 See id. (Nicholas, I., dissenting).
92 Steuer v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 282 (1975).
931 Id. (quoting Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617, 620 (Ct C1. 1973)).
94 Actually, the first judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to use the word "chutzpah" in a reported decision was Judge Broderick. He
used the term in passing in a 1984 decision to describe the plaintiff's behavior in
seeking an injunction for patent infiingement at the same time that the ownership
and validity of the patent were being challenged in another court. See Shelcore, Inc.
v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1 Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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speedy and inexpensive determination" required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.96
It was almost ten years until the word "chutzpah" appeared again in a
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In Checkpoint
Systems, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission,97 Judge
Lourie used the word "chutzpah" to describe the plaintiff. Checkpoint
argued that the equities favored a second inventor over an earlier inventor
because the earlier inventor had failed to exercise his rights. In fact, both
inventors were employees of Checkpoint, and Checkpoint delayed the first
inventor's efforts while using his help to further develop the invention.
Checkpoint then negotiated a better contractual relationship with the
second inventor.98 Judge Lourie stated that, "Checkpoint's assertion now
that the prior inventor 'slept' on his invention may qualify as the new
definition of 'chutzpah.' 9 Perhaps fearing that in its years of disuse the
word had slipped from consciousness, Judge Lourie also set out the classic
definition for the word "chutzpah," defining the word for the first time in
an opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He noted that
"chutzpah," which Checkpoint now threatened to redefine, is "[c]ommonly
used to describe the behavior of a person who kills his parents and pleads
for the court's mercy on the ground of being an orphan."'"
In Refac International, Ltd. v. Lotus Development Corp.,' the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit elevated its use of the word "chutzpah"
into the "chutzpah award." In Refac, the plaintiff argued that the previous
affidavit it had submitted in support of its patent application did not
demonstrate the plaintiff's intent to mislead because it was only an
affidavit of opinion, not of fact, and the Patent and Trademark Office
cannot rely on an opinion affidavit in such context. 2 In another opinion
penned by Judge Lourie, the court, noting its use of the word "chutzpah"
in Checkpoint, stated, "arguing that an affidavit submitted to persuade was
defective as presenting only opinion, not fact, and that it should be
discounted, qualifies only for a chutzpah award, not a reversal."' 3
96 See id. at 671 n.2 (Bennett, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56).
97Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
98 See id. at 758-59.
99Id. at 763.
100 Id. at 763 n.7.
101 Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
101 See id. at 1584.03Id. (citations omitted).
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In April 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit bestowed
its chutzpah award once again. In Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co. v.
CFMT, Inc.,'°4 the defendant, in essence, argued that a parent company can
incorporate a holding company in another state, transfer its patents to the
holding company, and arrange to have those patents licensed back to the
parent by virtue of its complete control of the holding company."5 It could
then threaten its competitors with infringement without fear of creating
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, except perhaps in the state of incorpora-
tion of the holding company.106 The court, noting its earlier decisions in
Refac and Checkpoint, responded by stating that "this argument qualifies
for one of our 'chutzpah' awards."'0 7
VII. THE CHUTZPAH DOCTRINE
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
("D.C. Circuit") first used the word "chutzpah" in a reported decision. This
use would eventually evolve into the D.C. Circuit's "chutzpah doctrine."
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass "n, International,"8 the
court addressed the reinstatement ofapilot found to have been flying while
under the influence of alcohol.1° The airline contested the arbitration award
rendered by the airline system board of adjustment which ordered the
conditional reinstatement of the pilot. 10 The district court found for the
airline. However, while it might seem that the true chutzpah lay with the
pilot and the union for demanding reinstatement despite the immense
danger posed to passengers, the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that "[i]t
would be the height of judicial chutzpah for us to second-guess the present
judgment of the FAA recertifying Morrison [the pilot] for flight duty."''
Judge Silberman wrote the D.C. Circuit's decision inSouthwesternBell
Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission,I" referencing the opinion
'o Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
t05 See id. at 1267-69.
'06 See id.
107 Id. at 1271.
"'
08 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
See id. at 78-79.
1,0 See id. at 80.
... Id. at 83.
12 Southwestern Bell Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 896 F.2d
1378 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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in Northwest. The court in Southwestern Bell found that the plaintiffs
argument for judicial deference towards FCC regulatory efforts in another
appeal pending before the D.C. Circuit while challenging in Southwestern
the FCC's regulatory efforts bordered on "chutzpah."'1
In Harbor Insurance Co. v. Schnabel Foundation Co., 4 the D.C.
Circuit, in another decision by Judge Silberman, again had good reason to
invoke the word "chutzpah." Harbor involved a dispute as to liability
between a construction contractor and its subcontractor. The court noted
that:
Schnabel puts forth two theories. The first, which we think quite striking,
is that OMNI was negligent in relying on Schnabel's own decision to use
a wood lagging rather than a steel shoring system on the excavation wall
adjacent to the Sears building. OMNI, we are toldby Schnabel, should not
have listened to Schnabel. It is certainly somewhat unorthodox for one
party to a lawsuit to assert that the second party was negligent for relying
on the first party.'
In rejecting this argument, the court, citing its decision inNorthwest, noted,
"It reminds us of the legal definition of chutzpah: chutzpah is a young man,
convicted of murdering his parents, who argues for mercy on the ground
that he is an orphan."' 6
In Marks v. Commissioner,"7 the D.C. Circuit's "chutzpah doctrine"
was finally born. Marks was a per curiam decision to which Judge
Silberman contributed. In Marks, fugitives from criminal prosecution
argued that inadequate efforts were made to notify them of their tax
delinquency. 18 The court found that "it is quite apparent that the reason the
Markses kept the Commissioner-and the govermment-unapprised of their
whereabouts was because they were fugitives from criminal
prosecution."1 9 Citing its earlier decisions in Harbor and Northwest, the
court noted, "to turn around and blame the Commissioner for not finding
them runs afoul of this court's developing 'chutzpah' doctrine."1 20
1 3Id. at 1381 n.2.
14 Harbor Ins. Co. v. Schnabel Found. Co., 946 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
'sId. at 937 (footnote omitted).
1"6 Id. at 937 n.5 (citation omitted).
1 7Marks v. Commissioner, 947 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
s See id. at 985.
119 Id. at 986.0Id. (citations omitted).
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In United States v. Reese, 2 1 the D.C. Circuit addressed the appeal of a
defendant who had been convicted of carrying a pistol without a license,
but had fled before sentencing. The court established a general rule that a
defendant whose flight prevents consolidation of his appeal with that of a
co-defendant is not entitled to a belated appeal. The court reasoned that by
thwarting consolidation, such flight inherently disrupts the appellate
process. The court, citing thefHarbor definition of chutzpah, as well as The
Joys of Yiddish by Leo Rosten, noted that to reward the fugitive by granting
his claim to a second assignment of the court's limited resources would be
perverse.1
In Fischer v. Resolution Trust Corp., the D.C. Circuit came close to
invoking the chutzpah doctrine again. In Fischer, an accounting firm
challenged a decision by the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") that it
could not contract for the accounting firm's services because of a conflict
of interest created by a lawsuit that RTC was filing against'the firm. The
accounting firm argued that RTC's refusal to contract with it was a
debarment without due process. The court found that the accounting firm
was essentially arguing that it had the right to put the RTC's lawsuit on
trial. However, in its reply brief and oral arguments, the accounting firm
retreated to a claim that it should be able to demonstrate that its image
should not be tarnished by a lawsuit. In the court's decision, Judge
Silberman, citingHarborandNorthwest, observedthat the accounting firm
may have retreated in its position for fear it was running afoul of the D.C.
Circuit's chutzpah doctrine.'24
Most recently, in Caribbean Shippers Ass "n v. Surface Transportation
Board,1" a decision issued just weeks before the Supreme Court's own
chutzpah decision, Judge Silberman's opinion invokedthe possibility of the
chutzpah doctrine. In rejecting the plaintiff's petition, the court found that
the plaintiff might have essentially been arguing that the use of only one
inspection and categorization company by all carriers caused the plaintiff
injury, because in the absence of competition, the plaintiff would not be
able to persuade the inspection company to be less vigilant in enforcement
of compliance activities. The court, citing Marks and Harbor, stated,
... United States v. Reese, 993 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
' See id. at 256-57.
Fischer v. Resolution Trust Corp., 59 F.3d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
'
24 See id. at 1350 ("Perhaps sensing that this position runs afoul of this circuit's
chutzpah doctrine.... [petitioner] retreat[s].").
" Caribbean Shippers Ass'n, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 145 F.3d 1362 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
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"Indeed, if that is petitioner's injury, it is doubtful that it would have
prudential standing; and it seems that it runs afoul of the court's chutzpah
doctrine."'2 6
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT'S
(OR AT LEAST JUSTICE SCALIA'S) CHUTZPAH
A. Justice Antonin Scalia
With both the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and the Federal Circuit having used the term within the
previous few weeks, the time was ripe for the Supreme Court of the United
States to invoke the word "chutzpah." National Endowmentfor the Arts v.
Finley,127 a case that addressed the government's right to choose which
artistic expressions to sponsor, provided the perfect forum for the highest
court in the land to exercise its right to express itself.
Itwas especially apropos that JusticeAntonin Scalia's concurrencewas
the first opinion of the Supreme Court to use the term "chutzpah." Justice
Scalia has been admired, even by his ideological opponents, for his
appropriate sense of humor in discussing deeply important subjects such as
religion and politis.128 Furthermore, Scalia, a devout Catholic raised in
Queens, New York, has repeatedly called for more expressions of tradition
and religion in American society.'2 9 The use of the word "chutzpah," with
its historical roots and association with Judaism, may fulfill such a role.
Indeed, Justice Scalia has argued that the Rehnquist Court has gone too far
in prohibiting a wide range of religious expression in public activity.30
While Yiddish has been equally associated with both anti-religious
movements and religious movements, the majority of those who are now
conversant in Yiddish are in fact very religious. Therefore, Justice Scalia's
invocation of the word "chutzpah" can be seen as an attempt to bring
greater religious expression to public activity. However, the ability to
employ Justice Scalia's use of the word "chutzpah" as a predictor of future
26Id. at 1365 n.3 (citations omitted).
'
27 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
128 See Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Antonin
Scalia, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427,428 (1997).
129 See Eric J. Greenberg, In Pursuit of Justice: Addressing JTS Audience,
Supreme Court's Scalia Offers His Views on Religion and the Constitution, JEWISH
WK., May 24, 1996, at 13, available in 1996 WL 15747331.
130 See id.
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decisions or even to interpret past decisions is limited. As one scholar has
noted in the context of assigning ideas to Justice Frankfurter based on his
Jewish heritage, "[t]o make claims about connections between... identity
and the development of legal ideas is to venture into a treacherous
domain. In general, demonstrating casual connections between context
and text is a challenge for even the most accomplished intellectual
historian."'1
However, Justice Scalia's use of the word "chutzpah" comports not just
with his personal views, but also with his legal philosophy. Scalia favors
the "nonpreferentialist" view, which posits that government may support
religion in general but not in a way that prefers any particular religion.132
Justice Scalia set out his nonpreferentialist interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause in his dissenting opinion in Lee v. Weisman,'33 approving a
rabbi's invocation, which was similar to the "Shehecheyanu," a traditional
Jewish prayer of thanksgiving, at a high school graduation.'34 For Justice
Scalia, a Catholic Supreme Court Justice in a country where the majority
religion is Christianity, to use a term of a Jewish cultural language could
be viewed as in keeping with the nonpreferentialist legal doctrine.
It is understandable that Justice Scalia was the first Justice to use the
word "chutzpah." He had no fear of accusations that the use of a Yiddish
word would brand him as an advocate for the promotion of minority
religions. In his majority opinion in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,'35 Justice Scalia dealt a serious blow to the Free
Exercise Clause, which protects minority religions. In that opinion, Justice
Scalia ruled that as long as the government does not overtly or intentionally
discriminate against adherents of particular religious beliefs when it enacts
a generally applicable law, the Free Exercise Clause does not insulate such
1' NomiM. Stolzenberg, Un-Covering the Tradition ofJewish "Dissimilation ":
Frankfurter, Bickel, and Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
809, 813 (1994); see also BARBARA A. PERRY, A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME
COURT?: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 55-88
(1991) (discussing the allocation of a Jewish seat on the Supreme Court). But see
BURT, supra note 58 (comparing Justice Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis and
the influence of their Jewish heritage on their judicial philosophies).
132 See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 875, 877-79 (1986).
,
33 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
'3 See id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
,3' Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
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adherents from complying with the law, even at the cost of violating
sincere religious beliefs.13 6
B. Justice Scalia's Concurrence in Finley
The Supreme Court often grants certiorari in order to resolve splits
between the circuits. However, Justice Scalia's concurrence failed to
resolve the split between the Federal Circuit, which believes chutzpah is to
be used as an "award," and the D.C. Circuit, which believes chutzpah is a
"doctrine." Instead, Scalia returned to the broader general use of the term
first annunciated in earlier judicial decisions.
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,'37 a number of perfor-
mance artists and an artists' organization brought an action against the
National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") claiming that the denial of grant
applications violated the artists' constitutional rights.13 1 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, found that 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1),139 which requires
the NEAto ensure that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria
by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public,"'14 didnot inherently interfere with the First Amendment
so as to be facially invalid and was not unconstitutionally vague.'' The
NEA had interpreted the statute as merely suggesting that "general
standards of decency and respect" be added to the list of criteria to be
considered and had formed a panel ofgeographically and ethnically diverse
members to comply with the statute.42 Justice O'Connor likewise noted
that the statute's language was advisory, as opposed to Congress's more
explicit, affirmative requirements statutes.4 3 Therefore, she found that
the artists had not demonstrated a substantial risk that application of
§ 954(d)(1) would lead to the suppression of free expression. 4 Further-
more, Justice O'Connor found that although § 954(d)(1)'s terms are
'
36 See id.; see also Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz: A Roadblock to MeaningfulJudicialEnforcement ofConstitutionalRights, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 285, 382-88 (1991).
' National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
138 See id. at 2174.
139 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1985).
140 Id.
141 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179-80.
'
42 See id. at 2171.
'
43 See id. at 2175.
'44 See id. at 2179-80.
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opaque, when the government acts as a patron and not as a sovereign, the
consequences of its imprecision are not constitutionally severe.
45
The exasperation that Justice Scalia expressed about the artists'
challenge to the statute, the NEA's interpretation of that same statute, and
even Justice O'Connor's position in the majority opinion all set the stage
for the historic first use of the word "chutzpah" in a decision of the United
States Supreme Court. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the
majority's position that the statute was constitutional. However, he found
that the NEA's view of the statute as merely an instruction, rather than a
directive from Congress to utilize viewpoint-based discrimination, was
truly chutzpah. He wrote, "It takes a particularly high degree of chutzpah
for theNEAto contradict this proposition, since the agency itself discrimi-
nates ... in favor of artistic (as opposed to scientific, or political, or
theological) expression."'" There it is: the historic first use of the word
"chutzpah" in a Supreme Court decision. It is interesting to note that
although Justice Scalia felt the need to define the words "decency" and
"respect" (and called ontheAmericanHeritageDictionaryto do so), he did
not define what "chutzpah" means. 47 Undoubtedly, this is because the
word is now so obviously a part of the American judicial lexicon.
It is also interesting that Justice Scalia chose this opportunity to invoke
the word "chutzpah," as some might find that he displayed chutzpah in his
description both of Justice O'Connor's decision and the NEA's action.
Regarding Justice O'Connor's decision, he wrote: "'The operation was a
success, but the patient died.' What such a procedure is to medicine, the
Court's opinion in this case is to law. It sustains the constitutionality of 20
U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) by gutting it.' 148
Regarding the NEA's conduct, Justice Scalia wrote:
I cannot refrain from observing, however, that if the vagueness doctrine
were applicable, the agency charged with making grants under a statutory
standard of "artistic excellence"-and which has itself thought that
standard met by everything from the playing of Beethoven to a depiction
of a crucifix immersed in urine-would be of more dubious constitutional
validity than the "decency" and "respect" limitations that respondents
(who demand to be judged on the same strict standard of "artistic
excellence") have the humorlessness to call too vague. 49
145 See id.
146 Id. at 2183 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
147 See id. at 2180-81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148 Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
,
49 Id. at 2184-85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia's sharp remarks clearly exhibit the very chutzpah he has
noted. Tins is a prnme example of the flexibility of nuance that "chutzpah"
implies. Depending on one's feeling for the NEA and its interpretation of
the statute and on one's opinion ofJustice O'Connor's decision in this case,
one might view Justice Scalia's comments as unduly barbed and audacious.
Likewise, one might view them as humorous, spirited, and keen. Only the
word "chutzpah" can connote both at the same time.
IX. CONCLUSION
The use of Yiddish in court decisions, the evolution of the word
"chutzpah" into an award, championship, and doctrine, and the appearance
of the word "chutzpah" in a concurring decision by a Supreme Court
Justice reflect the uniqueness of the United States and celebrate its
wonderful cultural mosaic. While American Jewish lawyers initially faced
discrimination in the United States, there is now such acceptance of
peoples of different heritage that a term from Yiddish, a Jewish cultural
language, has been used in the highest court of the land. This mirrors the
United States's appreciation of cultural differences and ongoing promotion
and protection of cohesive diversity Maybe this is the most fantastic
chutzpah of all: while the world has an unfortunate history of prejudice, in
America, tolerance and pluralism are becoming traditional values.
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